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Background: The limited strength model of self-control predicts that acts of self-control impair subsequent
performance on tasks that require self-control (i.e., “ego depletion”), and the majority of the published research on
this topic is supportive of this prediction. Additional research suggests that this effect can be alleviated by
manipulating participants’ motivation to perform—for instance, by having participants swish a drink containing
carbohydrates, which is thought to function as a reward—or by requiring participants to complete two initial acts
of self-control rather than only one.
Methods: Here, we explore both the effect of having participants perform two initial tasks thought to require
self-control (versus two less self-control-intensive tasks) and the effect of swishing a drink containing sucrose
(compared to control drinks) on subsequent self-control. Outcomes were analyzed using standard null hypothesis
significance testing techniques (e.g., analysis of variance, t-tests). In some cases, test statistics were transformed into
Bayes factors to aid in interpretation (i.e., to allow for acceptance of the null hypothesis).
Results: We found that performing two self-control-intensive tasks actually improved subsequent self-control when
participants swished a drink containing sucrose between tasks. For participants who swished control drinks, we
found no evidence of ego depletion.
Conclusions: We conclude that claims that self-control failure is caused by the depletion of a resource (or that it
functions as if it relies on a limited resource) merit greater circumspection. Our results—all of which were either null
or contrary to predictions from the limited strength model—are important for researchers interested in patterns of
self-control failure.
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The limited strength model of self-control (Muraven &
Baumeister, 2000) specifies that self-control draws on a fi-
nite “psychological (and physiological) resource” (Bauer &
Baumeister, 2011; p. 79). Consequently, the model predicts
that self-regulatory actions impair subsequent acts of
self-control because they deplete the required resource,
resulting in a state dubbed ego depletion. The so-called
sequential task paradigm, in which participants first* Correspondence: mikem@miami.edu
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumperform tasks to manipulate the exertion of self-control
and then another task that enables measurement of any
resulting reductions in self-control (which we refer to as
the depletion effect), was designed to test this prediction
(Baumeister et al., 1998). Many researchers who have used
this paradigm report successful conceptual replicationa of
the depletion effect (Hagger et al., 2010).
Some researchers have searched for the resource upon
which self-control ostensibly draws. For example, Gailliot
et al. (2007) proposed that acts of self-control deplete brain
glucose levels and that ingesting sucrose (which contains
glucose) forestalls ego depletion. However, Gailliot et al.’s
(2007) findings have been questioned on the groundsed Central Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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(Kurzban, 2010; Schimmack, 2012). Furthermore, the
completion of self-control tasks of the kind that are typic-
ally used to test the depletion effect does not consistently
lower blood glucose levels (Kurzban, 2010; Molden, et al.,
2012), and published research suggests that the mere pres-
ence of sucrose in the mouth, which does not increase
blood glucose (Molden, et al., 2012) eliminates the
depletion effect (Molden, et al., 2012; Sanders et al.
2012; Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2013). These findings sug-
gest a motivational (i.e., glucose functions as a reward),
rather than metabolic (i.e., glucose functions as fuel),
explanation for the effect of glucose on depletion.
Other findings also suggest that the depletion effect
can be eliminated by manipulating psychological vari-
ables such as motivation and expectations. For example,
Muraven and Slessareva (2003) reported three experi-
ments in which depletion was eliminated through motiv-
ation manipulations. Results from four other experiments
suggest that the depletion effect obtains only when partici-
pants believe that self-control is limited, and that it disap-
pears when participants do not expect to be depleted
(Job et al. 2010; Martijn et al. 2002).
In the face of such evidence, which can be interpreted
as contradictory to the limited strength model, (Vohs
et al. 2012) have proposed that manipulations of belief
or motivation can eliminate only low levels of ego deple-
tion. To test this proposal, they ran two experiments
using a modified sequential task paradigm. In the first
experiment, they used (Job et al. 2010) methods to con-
vince participants that willpower was either limited or
unlimited. In the second experiment, participants’ mo-
tivation to perform was manipulated following Muraven
and Slessareva’s (2003) methods (i.e., by manipulating
the perceived importance of participants’ performance).
Participants in both experiments then either completed
a single control task, a single task requiring self-control,
or a set of tasks requiring self-control. After the initial
task (or set of tasks), participants completed two out-
come tasks thought to require self-control. Vohs et al.
(2012) predicted that completing more initial tasks
would result in greater ego depletion, and that the ma-
nipulations of belief or motivation would only be effective
at reducing less severe depletion (i.e., when participants
had completed only one or two initial tasks rather than
three or four). These patterns obtained, and were inter-
preted as evidence that “[a]cts of self-control and decision
making do in fact deplete some energy resource” (Vohs,
et al. 2012, p. 4).
Vohs et al.’s (2012) conclusion that an energy resource
had been depleted is problematic for two reasons. First,
terms like “resource” and “strength” can be read as purely
metaphorical (rather than literal) because the resource in
question has never been measured (nor has any means ofmeasuring it, other than via blood glucose, been pro-
posed). Second, Vohs et al.’s (2012) interpretation relies on
the assumption that a greater number of initial tasks
should result in a more severe performance decrement
(since more of the resource has been used). However,
several previous experiments revealed that including
more than a single task in the initial phase of the se-
quential task paradigm actually increases performance
on a subsequent task: Converse and DeShon (2009),
for instance, reported three experiments in which
completing two initial self-control-intensive tasks (ra-
ther than two initial tasks requiring less self-control)
improved performance on subsequent self-control tasks.
Furthermore, the literature on learned industriousness
(which inspired [Converse and DeShon 2009] work) in-
cludes many experiments that use a paradigm that is
nearly identical to the sequential task paradigm. These
experiments tend to show that requiring greater ini-
tial outlays of effort (e.g., on math problems and ana-
grams, which are thought to require self-control) causes
better performance on a final task—usually of the kind
that is thought to require self-control (e.g., analytical writ-
ing; Eisenberger et al. 1982; Hagger et al. 2010).
In light of the literature on learned industriousness
(see Eisenberger 1992), Converse and DeShon’s (2009)
findings, and recent experiments on tasting (rather than
digesting) glucose (e.g., Molden et al. 2012; Sanders
et al. 2012; Hagger & Chatzisarantis 2013), the common
interpretation of the depletion effect—that low perform-
ance is due to low resources—seems far from adequate.
Therefore, we designed the current study to examine
two issues: (a) whether the depletion effect obtains when
more than one task is used during the “depletion” phase
(i.e., before subsequent tasks that serve as dependent
variables); and (b) whether the depletion effect, when in-
duced by multiple initial tasks, can indeed be reduced by
having participants swish a drink sweetened with sucrose
compared to a drink sweetened with a control sweetener
(sucralose) or an unsweetened drink. We reasoned that
different patterns of results would be consistent with
specific, previously proposed models: Based on the lim-
ited strength model (Baumeister, et al. 1998; Vohs, et al.
2012), one would predict that participants who complete
two initial self-control tasks should perform worse on a
third self-control task compared to participants who
complete two initial tasks that are relatively less self-
control-intensive (i.e., the depletion effect). Based on the
work by Gailliot et al. (2007), one would also predict
that the depletion effect would not be observed for par-
ticipants who have ingested glucose. However, based on
more recent work (Molden et al. 2012; Sanders et al.
2012; Hagger & Chatzisarantis 2013), one would predict
that the depletion effect should also be reduced for
participants who merely rinsed their mouths with a
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In contrast, based on experiments inspired by learned
industriousness, one should predict that completing two
self-control-intensive tasks (i.e., expending a relatively
higher amount of effort) should actually increase subse-
quent self-control performance (e.g., Eisenberger et al.
1982; Eisenberger 1992; Converse & DeShon 2009). The
mechanism thought to underlie findings in the learned
industriousness work is described by the secondary re-
ward theory of industriousness: Rewarding high effort
results in continued high effort because the sensation of
effort is learned as a predictor of reward (Eisenberger
1992). Based on the secondary reward theory of industri-
ousness, therefore, one would predict that increased
self-control performance on a third task will only follow
the completion of self-control-intensive tasks if partici-
pants are subsequently rewarded in some way. In the
current experiment, the sweet taste of either sucrose- or
sucralose-sweetened drinks may be rewarding, so based
on the secondary reward theory of industriousness, one
would predict that participants who swish either sucrose-
or sucralose-sweetened drinks following high effort
(i.e., completing two self-control tasks, rather than two
relatively less self-control-intensive tasks) will perform
better on the third self-control task. Note, however, that
Converse and DeShon (2009) found that, for participants
who completed multiple, unrewarded self-control tasks,
subsequent self-control performance was improved rela-
tive to the performance of participants who completed
multiple, unrewarded tasks that required relatively less
self-control. Based on these findings, one would predict
that completing multiple initial self-control-intensive tasks
should increase subsequent performance, regardless of
whether completion of these tasks was rewarded (i.e.,
regardless of the type of drink given to participants).
Methods
Participants
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants read and
signed a consent form that had been reviewed and ap-
proved by the University of Miami Institutional Review
Board. All methods and procedures were likewise ap-
proved by the University of Miami Institutional Review
Board. Participants (N = 257) completed the experiment
during individual sessions in exchange for $10 and par-
tial fulfillment of a course requirement. We instructed
participants to avoid eating for ≥ 3hours before attending
the laboratory session. Seventeen participants were ex-
cluded from data analysis because they failed to follow
instructions (e.g., failed to fast before the experiment).
Five additional participants’ dependent variable measure-
ments were lost due to experimenter error. Therefore,
the final sample included 235 participants (110 males).We planned to restrict data collection to a single se-
mester. We examined the data at several points before
the semester’s end, and approximately 60% of the way
through data collection, no effects had reached statistical
significance, so we stopped assigning participants to the
unsweetened rinse condition to increase power for other
comparisons that we viewed as more important. Conse-
quently, the ns of the two sweetened rinse conditions
(nsucrose = 92, nsucralose = 93) are larger than is the n for
the unsweetened condition (nunsweetened = 50). Testing
predictions prior to the completion of data collection in-
creases the risk of false positives, though this risk drops
as sample sizes increase (Simmons et al. 2011), and the
end of data collection was not determined by any par-
ticular pattern of results.
Procedure
Participants completed the experiment individually dur-
ing one-hour laboratory sessions that we had described
as investigating “impression formation and cognitive func-
tion”. Participants were randomly assigned to either a
high-effort or a low-effort condition (see below) and one
of three rinse conditions: rinsing with a Kool-aid drink
that was either unsweetened, sweetened with sucrose
(171grams of sugar dissolved into 2 quarts of Kool-aid), or
sweetened with sucralose (14 tablespoons of Splenda dis-
solved into 2 quarts of Kool-aid). Note that the Kool-aid
flavoring mix we used was not sweet by itself.
Participants first completed two commonly used
depletion tasks: (a) watching a brief video of a woman
being interviewed during which words are presented in
the bottom of the screen (Schmeichel et al. 2003); and (b)
writing an essay describing a vacation (Schmeichel 2007).
Participants in the high-effort condition were instructed
to avoid reading the words on the screen during the video
and to avoid using the letters “a” and “n” while writing
the essay. Participants in the low-effort condition were
instructed to watch the video as they would watch any
other video and received no additional instructions for
the essay.
Following these two initial tasks, participants were told
that they would be participating in a “taste test” during
which they would taste (but not swallow) and rate a
drink. Each participant was given six ounces of the ap-
propriate drink and instructed to take a sip of the drink,
swish it for ten seconds, and then spit into another cup.
Participants were asked to repeat this process until they
had tasted the full six ounces. In previous work using
this method, compliance with the instructions not to
swallow the drink was assessed through the measure-
ment of blood glucose (Molden, et al. 2012). Results
indicated that even if participants had ingested a small
amount of glucose, contrary to investigators’ instruc-
tions, it was insufficient to increase blood glucose.
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between completion of the taste test and the beginning
of the dependent variable measurements. During this
time, participants completed a questionnaire that in-
cluded rating items about the tasks and the drink they
sampled, the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS;
Mayer & Gaschke 1988), and some additional items not
analyzed here (see Additional files 1 and 2). Afterward,
participants sat quietly for the balance of ten minutes,
ostensibly waiting for the experimenter to prepare the
next part of the experiment.
Next, participants completed a version of a working
memory task called the operation span (OSPAN), in
which they were presented with sets of words to remem-
ber. Participants were presented with 15 sets of words,
containing between two and five words. In each set,
words were presented one at a time, and the presenta-
tion of a word was followed by the presentation of a
mathematical equality, such as (9 x 3) – 1 = 2. Partici-
pants were instructed to remember each word until the
end of a set, at which point they were asked to recall as
many words as possible from only the set they had just
completed. Additionally, participants were instructed
that when they saw an equality, they were to respond
either “yes” or “no” to indicate whether they believed the
equality was true. The rate of presentation of word/
equality pairs was controlled by the participant. The
OSPAN provides four possible measures of working
memory performance: the total number of full sets of
words remembered (maximum 15 sets), the total num-
ber of words remembered across all sets (maximum 48
words), the longest set of words remembered (maximum
five words), and the number of words in fully recalled sets
only (maximum 48 words). Schmeichel (2007) reported
that OSPAN performance, as measured by each of the
above variables, generally decreased for participants who
had previously exercised self-control (i.e., the depletion
effect).
After the OSPAN, participants completed another
questionnaire comprising two items about how difficult
and how boring they found the OSPAN, an item about
the last time they had eaten, and several items irrelevant
to the present work (see Additional file 1). Participants
were then thanked, debriefed, and paid.
Results
Dependent variables were analyzed using 2 (effort: high
vs. low) × 3 (rinse: sucrose, sucralose, or unsweetened)
analysis of variance (ANOVA). See Table 1 for all test
statistics for these models; see Additional file 3, for ns,
means, and standard deviations. For between-condition
comparisons, we used independent-samples t-tests when
either the main effect for rinse or the effort*rinse inter-
action reached statistical significance (See Table 2).For each of the main effects and interactions in the
ANOVAs, alpha = .05. However, the alpha levels for
follow-up tests were modified using a Bonferroni correc-
tion specific to outcome category (i.e., the category-wise
error rate was held constant). There are four main categor-
ies of outcome variables: Rinse ratings, initial task ratings,
self-reported mood, and OSPAN ratings/performance (see
Tables 1 and 2).
Rinse, initial task, and mood ratings
Participants reported disliking the unsweetened rinse
more than either of the sweetened rinses. They also
rated the unsweetened rinse as more unpleasant and less
sweet than either of the sweetened rinses (ratings for
the two sweetened rinses did not differ; see Table 2,
column 1). For initial task ratings, participants in the
high-effort condition reported that they found the essay
more difficult than did participants in the low-effort con-
dition. Additionally, participants in the sucrose rinse con-
dition reported that the video task was more difficult than
did participants in the unsweetened rinse condition (rat-
ings were not different between the sucralose and un-
sweetened conditions; see Table 2, column 2). For models
predicting the mood rating scores, no terms reached stat-
istical significance (see Table 1).
OSPAN ratings and performance
The effort and rinse conditions did not affect how boring
participants found the OSPAN. For the difficulty ratings
of the OSPAN, the main effect for effort condition was
statistically significant: Participants in the high-effort con-
dition rated the OSPAN as subjectively less difficult than
did those in the low-effort condition. The main effect for
rinse condition was also significant, but post-hoc tests did
not reveal any statistically significant pairwise differences.
As mentioned above, the OSPAN (Schmeichel 2007)
yields four measures of working memory capacity. These
measures were highly intercorrelated (all rs ≥ .75; see
Additional file 4). To condense the number of statistical
tests required, we used principal components analysis to
reduce the four potential outcome variables to a single
score that reflected variation in OSPAN performanceb.
One clear principal component emerged (Eigenvalue of
3.55), which accounted for 88.84% of the variance in par-
ticipants’ scores on the four measures of working mem-
ory capacity. Participants’ scores on this component served
as our primary outcome variable for testing changes in
OSPAN performance.
For the OSPAN component score, the main effect for
rinse was nonsignificant, but the main effect for effort
was statistically significant: Overall, participants in the
low-effort condition had worse (not better) working mem-
ory performance than did participants in the high-effort
condition (d = −0.30). This main effect was modified by a
Table 1 Full factorial ANOVA results for the four experiment outcome categories
Outcome Main effects Interaction effect
Effort Rinse Effort × rinse
Rinse rating: Sweetness F(1, 229) = 1.26 F(2, 229) = 40.58*** F(2, 229) = 1.28
Pleasantness F(1, 229) = 0.83 F(2, 229) = 16.20*** F(2, 229) = 1.91
Liking F(1, 228) = 0.00 F(2, 228) = 17.23*** F(2, 228) = 1.63
Initial task Video difficulty F(1, 229) = 1.32 F(2, 229) = 4.07* F(2, 229) = 0.15
Essay difficulty F(1, 229) = 412.00*** F(2, 229) = 0.58 F(2, 229) = 0.22
Mood: Pleasant-unpleasant F(1, 225) = 0.30 F(2, 225) = 0.30 F(2, 225) = 0.05
Active-calm F(1, 225) = 0.40 F(2, 225) = 0.85 F(2, 225) = 1.52
OSPAN: Difficulty F(1, 212) = 4.20* F(2, 212) = 3.69* F(2, 212) = 1.39
Boredom F(1, 212) = 0.35 F(2, 212) = 1.50 F(2, 212) = 0.61
Performance F(1, 229) = 5.86* F(2, 229) = 0.08 F(2, 229) = 3.54*
Note. ***p < .001; *p < .05.
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this interaction by comparing the means of the high-effort
group and the low-effort group at each level of the rinse
factor (see Table 2, column 3). Participants in the low-
effort condition did not perform differently from those in
the high-effort condition if they had previously swished
an unsweetened (d = 0.50) or sucralose-sweetened rinse
(d = −0.12), but participants in the high-effort condition
performed significantly better than those in the low-effort
condition if they had previously swished the sucrose-
sweetened rinse (d = 0.63; see Figure 1 and Table 2). These
data resist easy interpretation in terms of the limited
strength model, but are reasonably consistent with the no-
tion of learned industriousness inasmuch as the presenceTable 2 Post-hoc mean comparisons and tests of simple effec
and performance
Rinse ratings: Initial task di
Liking Video d
tun-s(140) = -5.94, p < .001, d = -1.04 tun-s(141) = -2.81
†tun-su(119.38) = -5.22, p < .001, d = -.86 tun-su(140) = -1.29
ts-su(182) = .91, p = .37, d = .13 ts-su(183) = -1.80, p
Sweetness
†tun-s(67.49) = -6.70, p < .001, d = -1.36
†tun-su(69.97) = -6.48, p < .001, d = -1.30
ts-su(183) = .26, p = .79, d = .04
Unpleasantness
†tun-s(128.8) = 6.58, p < .001, d = 1.05
†tun-su(133.66) = 5.01, p < .001, d = .79
ts-su(183) = -1.29, p = .20, d = -.19
Note. Alpha levels have been corrected using a Bonferroni correction within each o
.017 for initial task difficulty ratings, and .008 for OSPAN ratings and performance. I
level. †Indicates that equal variances between groups has not been assumed (based
“s” = Sucrose rinse condition. “su” = Sucralose rinse condition. “hi” = High-effort cond
participant were not always available; see Additional file 3, for ns, means, and standof an unconditioned reinforcer (the taste of sugar) appar-
ently increased subsequent mental effort.
Follow-up analyses of OSPAN performance using Bayes
factors
The above results were obtained using standard statis-
tical methodology (i.e., null hypothesis significance testing),
which is both biased toward rejecting the null hypothesis
(particularly when the sample size is large) and unsuitable
for quantifying evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e., failure
to reject the null can only be interpreted as a state of
ignorance; Rouder et al. 2009). Given the importance
of null findings for advancing theory (Laws 2013), we
conducted follow-up analyses that do not suffer fromts for rinse ratings, initial task ratings, and OSPAN ratings
fficulty ratings OSPAN ratings and performance
ifficulty OSPAN difficulty
, p = .006, d = -.49 †tun-s(112.55) = -2.09, p = .04, d = .38
, p = .20, d = -.22 †tun-su(118.18) = -.02, p = .98, d = -.01
= .07, d = .27 ts-su(171) = -2.27, p = .03, d = -.35
OSPAN performance
tun: hi-lo(48) = -1.76, p = .09. d = .50
tsu: hi-lo(90) = -.59, p = .56, d = -.12
ts: hi-lo(91) = -3.05, p = .003, d = .63
utcome category (i.e., each column), such that alpha = .006 for rinse ratings,
talicized font indicates statistical significance relative to the corrected alpha
on a statistically significant Levene's test). “un” = Unsweet rinse condition.





























Figure 1 Average OSPAN performance as a function of effort and rinse conditions. Note.*p = .003. Error bars are equal to 95%
confidence intervals.
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independent-samples t-tests (Rouder et al. 2009). Using a
web-based application (http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor),
we calculated Bayes factors for the three independent
samples t-tests that were used to compare OSPAN per-
formance between the high- and low-effort groups for
each of the three rinse conditions (i.e., the ts in the second
row, third column of Table 2). These Bayes factors can be
thought of as ratios of the evidence for the null hypothesis
to evidence for the alternative hypothesis (i.e., Bayes fac-
tors smaller than 1 represent support for the alternative,
whereas Bayes factors greater than 1 represent support for
the null). Bayes factors can be directly interpreted (e.g., a
Bayes factor of 6 means that the null is six times more
likely than the alternative). For the Bayes factor calculation
we used, the null hypothesis is specified as a difference of
zero between means of the groups, and the alternative hy-
pothesis is specified as any non-zero difference between
groups (as it is in the standard t-test).
The following Bayes factors were found across levels
of the rinse factor. In the sucrose condition, the Bayes
factor was .096, which can be interpreted as “substantial
evidence” that for people who have tasted sucrose, a
high outlay of initial cognitive effort led to better per-
formance on the OSPAN (rather than worse perform-
ance, as the limited strength model would predict). In the
sucralose condition, the Bayes factor was 5.31, which can
be interpreted as “substantial evidence” that, for people
who have tasted sucralose, pairs of high-effort or low-effort
initial tasks do not produce differences in subsequent
OSPAN performance (i.e., the difference between perform-
ance in the two groups is zero). In the unsweetened rinsecondition, the Bayes factor was 1.22; which can be inter-
preted as merely “anecdotal evidence” (i.e., “worthy of no
more than a bare mention”; Wagenmakers et al. 2011) in
favor of the null hypothesis.
Discussion
Our results suggest that the presence of sucrose in the
mouth (but, importantly, not lower in the digestive tract;
Gailliot et al. 2007) does not merely return performance
to normal levels, as observed previously (e.g., Molden
et al. 2012), but instead may enhance performance follow-
ing high mental effort. This finding is generally consistent
with all motivation-based accounts of performance, in
which high self-control performance is theorized as being
due to a strategic increase in effort designed to achieve
tasks that have been deemed important or that result in
the receipt of reward (e.g., Eisenberger 1992; Beedie &
Lane 2012; Baumeister & Vohs 2007; Molden et al. 2012;
Inzlicht & Schmeichel 2012; Kurzban et al. (2013)). Im-
portantly, however, the lack of evidence for the deple-
tion effect (or, in terms of the Bayesian analysis, the
evidence for the null model), makes our results diffi-
cult to reconcile with all models that predict de-
creased self-control performance as a function of previous
self-control (e.g., Beedie & Lane 2012; Baumeister & Vohs
2007; Molden et al. 2012; Inzlicht & Schmeichel 2012;
Kurzban et al. (2013)).
Instead, our data seem most consistent with an inter-
pretation based on the secondary reward theory of indus-
triousness (Eisenberger 1992), which does not predict that
initial high effort will necessarily lead to subsequent low
effort. For example, the taste of sucrose after the initial
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forced high mental effort so that on the subsequent work-
ing memory task, participants worked harder and
performed better, whereas for participants in the low-
effort condition, the taste of sucrose encouraged contin-
ued low-levels of effort. Interestingly, if this interpretation
is correct, it would appear that the sweet taste of sucralose
did not function as a reward, which would be consistent
with previous work showing that, in humans, the presence
of carbohydrates in the mouth is related to patterns of ac-
tivation in brain regions that are typically associated with
the receipt of reward, whereas the presence of saccharin,
an artificial sweetener, is not (Chambers et al. 2009). Of
course, we offer this interpretation post hoc, and the
experiment reported here was exploratory, so we caution
against overconfidence in this explanation. Our findings
that sucrose in the mouth improves performance follow-
ing high mental effort should serve to motivate future
replication efforts, rather than as solid evidence that such
a phenomenon exists.
Nevertheless, because performing high-effort initial
tasks rather than low-effort initial tasks did not reduce
performance in any of the rinse conditions, our findings
represent a failed conceptual replication of the depletion
effect, as predicted by the limited strength model (e.g.,
Baumeister, et al. 1998; Gailliot et al. 2007; Hagger et al.
2010; Vohs et al. 2012). The published literature evaluat-
ing the depletion effect contains very few contradictory
results such as ours (e.g., 196 of the 198 effect sizes
included in Hagger et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis were in
the direction predicted by the limited strength model,
and only 47 were statistically non-significant), but the
relatively large size of our sample (contra most experi-
ments that have been completed on these topics; Hagger
et al. 2010) leads us to think that the present results
should be taken seriously by researchers interested in
self-control. Importantly, the fact that the relatively large
experiment reported here yielded a clear lack of support
for the depletion effect is consistent with concerns we
have raised elsewhere that the current meta-analytic
evidence for the depletion effect may be caused by pub-
lication bias, and that the true underlying effect size
may be either small or no different from zero (Carter &
McCullough 2013a, 2013b).
Given the results we report here, as well as our other
work in this area (Carter & McCullough 2013a, 2013b),
it seems plausible that the depletion effect, as measured
by the sequential task paradigm, may not be a robust
empirical phenomenon. An interpretation that is more
favorable to the limited strength model might be that
the sequential task paradigm is not an appropriate ex-
perimental procedure for studying the effect of previous
acts of self-control on subsequent self-control perform-
ance and perhaps different experimental procedures,such as those used in the literature on cognitive fatigue
(see Ackerman 2011), may measure a real phenomenon
that is conceptually similar to the depletion effect. An
even more favorable interpretation (albeit, one that
ignores the meta-analytic conclusions that we have re-
ported elsewhere; Carter & McCullough 2013) might be
that the depletion effect is moderated by the type of ex-
perimental task used in the sequential task paradigm—
that is, contrary to what was shown by Schmeichel
(2007) perhaps OSPAN performance does not decrease
when participants are depleted, but performance on
other outcome tasks, such as persistence at difficult
tasks, does (e.g., Baumeister, et al. 1998). It is noteworthy
that the OSPAN is not especially widely used in the lit-
erature on the limited strength model (Hagger et al.
2010)c. However, according to the limited strength
model, performance on any task that is thought to re-
quire self-control, such as the OSPAN, should suffer as a
function of previous acts of self-control, so if it is true
that the depletion effect is moderated by task type, the
limited strength model will require revision on the basis
of the results we have reported here.
The lack of a method for directly measuring the resource
on which self-control relies means that resource-based
explanations can be made consistent with the pattern of
data we report here: For example, one might propose
that the depletion effect would have been observed in
the present experiment if participants had been required
to complete a third initial task (i.e., our participants
were simply not fully depleted; Vohs et al. 2012). One
might also argue that participants who performed well
on the OSPAN used their remaining resources to do so,
and their depleted state would have been revealed had
we included one more dependent variable. It will only
be possible to rule such speculations out after the re-
source underlying self-control has been identified and a
method for measuring it developed. Of course, a similar
criticism can be leveled at any motivation-based ex-
planation for self-control failure that is not sufficiently
specific about the relationship between motivation and
self-control. Thus, future work by theorists interested
in resource-based and motivation-based explanations
of self-control failure, such as the limited strength
model, should focus on identifying and directly meas-
uring the resource in question, or the process by which
motivation changes (e.g., as proposed by Kurzban et al.
(2013), the motivation to perform on a task is a func-
tion of opportunity cost: The greater the potential re-
wards the participant forgoes by putting effort into the
task, the lower the participant’s motivation to perform
the task).
One important limitation of the current study is that
we did not measure blood glucose, so we cannot be cer-
tain that swishing the glucose sweetened drink did not
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some participants swallowed some of the glucose that
they were asked to swish. However, given the results of
previous work that suggests that swishing procedures
that are almost identical to those we used here do not
affect blood glucose levels (Molden et al. 2012, Experi-
ment 4), it seems likely that our procedures also did not
increase blood glucose. Furthermore, even if participants
did ingest some portion of the drinks they were given,
our major findings still present problems for the limited
strength model because we found no evidence for a de-
crease in self-control performance following the comple-
tion of tasks that required self-control. Consequently,
our tentative explanation for the results we did obtain,
which rely on the concept of learned industriousness,
would still hold (i.e., the presence of glucose in the mouth
should function as a reward, rather than as the replenish-
ment of a resource, just as its ingestion should, though
perhaps with weaker effect). Nevertheless, future experi-
menters might consider measuring blood glucose to better
arbitrate between the effects of sensing glucose in the
mouth rather than in the digestive system.
A second limitation of the current work is the possibil-
ity that our null findings were the result of inadequate
power. We did not conduct an a priori power analysis
for our tests of the depletion effect (as mentioned, our
data collection plan was to collect as much as possible
in one semester). A priori power analyses are difficult to
conduct for conceptual replications because it is not
known if the parameter estimates provided by previous
work generalize to the procedures that constitute the
conceptual replication. Nevertheless, assuming the alter-
native hypothesis is true (i.e., the depletion effect is non-
zero) for participants in the sucralose-sweetened and
unsweetened rinse conditions, then our test of the deple-
tion effect would have had 80% power for effect sizes of
d = 0.47 or greater. According to Hagger et al. (2010),
who provided a variety of meta-analytic estimates of the
depletion effect for subsamples of experiments that were
methodologically similar to ours, the depletion effect is at
least this large.
However, if the depletion effect is nonzero but consid-
erably smaller than d = 0.47, then the tests we conducted
here are underpowered, and it is possible that our failure
to find evidence for the depletion effect was due to low
statistical power. According to one interpretation of our
re-analyses of Hagger et al.’s (2010) meta-analytic data
(Carter & McCullough 2013a, 2013b), it is possible that
the depletion effect is indeed nonzero, but smaller than
was originally estimated. Specifically, we found that
based on one method of correcting for the influence of
publication bias (Moreno et al. 2009), it is possible that
the depletion effect is d = 0.25. If this estimate is correct,
then any test that comprises fewer than 252 participantsper group will have less than 80% power. Importantly,
188 of the 198 experiments reviewed by Hagger et al.
(2010) had a total sample size of N = 100 or less, and
the two largest experiments had total sample sizes of
N = 284 and 501. In other words, if the depletion ef-
fect is some small, nonzero magnitude, then it would
appear to be the case that the vast majority of experi-
ments that have been conducted have been under-
powered, including the one we report here.
Based on the experiment described here, as well as our
re-analysis of Hagger et al.’s (2010) work, we believe that
the balance of the evidence supports the conclusion that
the depletion effect is either not a robust phenomenon
or that it is considerably smaller than has been previ-
ously reported. This conclusion is directly contrary to
those that have been drawn by some other researchers
(e.g., Vohs et al. 2012; Hagger et al. 2010). Thus, as we
have recommended elsewhere (Carter & McCullough
2013a, 2013b), we believe that it is critical that researchers
conduct large-scale direct replications of the classic tests
of the depletion effect (e.g., replications of the experiments
reported by [Baumeister et al. 1998], but with total sam-
ples of at least N = 504).
Conclusions
Our findings, when combined with other recently ob-
tained results, cast doubt on the generality of the de-
pletion effect (e.g., Converse & DeShon 2009; Carter
& McCullough 2013a, 2013b), and on the role of glu-
cose as the limited resource underlying self-control
(e.g., Molden et al. 2012). Collectively, this work implies
that the proposition that self-control relies on an actual
resource (or even functions as if it did) requires additional
empirical and theoretical attention before scientists should
swallow it whole.
Endnotes
aFollowing Schmidt (2009), we use the term concep-
tual replication to refer to any attempt at replicating a
previous test via different methods. Conceptual replica-
tion can be contrasted with direct replication, which is
a repetition of a previous test via identical methods
(Schmidt 2009). For a test of the depletion effect, most
experiments are conceptual replications because different
combinations of self-control tasks are used in the sequen-
tial task paradigm.
bPrincipal component analysis, or PCA, is a mathem-
atical transformation that allows researchers to reduce a
set of variables to one or more so-called components.
PCA is technically different from factor analysis methods,
which are based on the common factor model and should
be used when the researcher wishes to explore how
unobserved latent variables (i.e., factors) underlie the
correlations between measured variables. Factor analysis,
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/2050-7283/1/22therefore, is based on a specific model and tests a specific
hypothesis. PCA, on the other hand, should be used when
a researcher simply wishes to reduce a set of measures
down to a set of independent components that account
for as much of the variance between the observed vari-
ables as possible (Fabrigar et al 1999). We chose to use
PCA because we were concerned with how our experi-
mental manipulations would affect variance in OSPAN
performance scores, rather than any hypothesis about the
latent variables underlying OSPAN performance.
cWe choose to use the OSPAN in our experiment
because it has been argued that working memory per-
formance indexes something fundamental to self-control
(e.g., Hofmann et al. 2011).Additional files
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